Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1966

Mildred N. Cornwell v. Ray H. Barton :
Respondent's Brief

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Hanson & Baldwin & Merlin R. Lybbert; Attorneys for
Respondent
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Cornwell v. Barton, No. 10557 (1966).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/3808

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
MILDRED N. CORNWELL,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No.

vs.
RAY H. BARTON,
Defendant and Respondent.

10557

11NIV£RSITY OF

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

UT~

SEP 3 O 1966

Appeal from Judgment of the Third Dist~~~Rr
for Salt Lake County
Honorable Merrill C. Faux, Judge
HANSON & BALDWIN &
MERLIN R. LYBBERT
909 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondent

LE

RAWLINGS, WALLACEF ,
o~,
ROBERTS & BLACK
9
530 Judge Building
MAY 1 2 1966
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellant
----------------------------- ·--··ci;:.k:--s~pr•m• Court, Ut.ih

INDEX

I

l

(

I
i

Page
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE ____________________________
1
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT-----------------------------1
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL -------------------------------1
STATEMENT OF FACTS ------------------------------------------2
ARGUMENT ---------------------------------------------------------------------2
POINT I. THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 9 DID
NOT CONSTITUTE A DIRECTED VERDICT,
NOR WAS IT A FORMULA INSTRUCTION.____
2
POINT II. THE SUBMISSION OF UNAVOIDABLE
ACCIDENT IN INSTRUCTION NO. 5 WAS NOT
ERROR. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 11
CONCLUSION-------------------------------------------------------------------- 16
CASES CITED
Bennett v. McCready, 57 Wash. 2d 317, 356 P.2d 712.. 13
Butigan v. Yellow Cab Co., 49 Cal. 2d 652, 320 P.2d
500, 65 A.L.R. 2d 1 ____________________________________ 12, 13, 14, 16
Carlburg v. Wesley Hospital and Nurse Training
School, 182 Kan. 634, 323 P.2d 638 -------------------- 14
Cooper v. Pay-N-Save Drugs, Inc., 59 Wash. 2d 829,
371 P.2d 43 ---------------------------------------------------------------- 13
Dennison v. Chapman, 6 Ut. 2d 379, 314 P.2d 838 ______ 15
Fenton v. Aleshire, 238 Ore. 24, 393 P.2d 217 ____________ 13
Hackworth v. Davis, 87 Ida. 98, 390 P.2d 422 ________________ 14
Haywood v. Rio Grande Railway, 6 Ut. 2d 155, 307
6
P.2d 1045 -------------------------------------------------------------------Hills v. McGillvrey, ____ Ore. ____ , 402 P.2d 722 ____________ 13
Ivie v. Richardson, 9 Ut. 2d 5, 336 P.2d 781 ---------------- 7, 8
.Jensen v. Dolen, 12 Ut. 2d 404, 367 P.2d 191 ______________ 16
Konold v. The Rio Grande Western Railway Company,
21 Utah 379, 60 P. 1021 -----------------------------------------9
Martin v. Sheffield, 112 Ut. 478, 189 P.2d 127 -----------7
McBee v. Knight, 239 Ore. 606, 398 P.2d 479 ------------ 13
Ortega v. Thomas, 14 Ut. 2d 296, 383 P.2d 406 ------------ 8
Pobor v. Western Pacific, 55 Cal. 2d 314, 359 P.2d 474 12
Porter v. Price, 11 Ut. 2d 80, 355 P.2d 66 ________________ ll, 16
6
Startin v. Madsen, 120 Ut. 631, 237 P.2d 834 ---------------Steele v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Ry. Co., 16
Ut. 2d 127, 396 P.2d 751 ---------------------------------------- 10
Taylor v. Weber County, 4 Ut. 2d 328, 293 P.2d 925____
7
6
Walkenhorst v. Kesler, 92 Ut. 312, 67 P.2d 654 -----------Wellman v. Noble, 12 Ut. 2d 350, 366 P.2d 701 ------------ 16
AUTHORITIES & TEXTS CITED
.fTFU, Instruction 16.1 ______ --------------------------------------------- 11

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
MILDRED N. CORNWELL,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No.

vs.

10557

RAY H. BARTON,

Defendant and Resporident.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action by plaintiff who was a guest
of defendant's tenant, to recover for personal injuries claimed to have been sustained when she fell
on a walkway owned by defendant.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Plaintiff has appealed from a judgment entered in favor of defendant on a jury finding of no
negligence. The case had been previously tried to a
court and jury. The defendant prevailed and plaintiff was granted a new trial. The appeal is from
the results of the retrial.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks to have the judgment entered
on the jury verdict affirmed.
1

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant accepts plaintiff's Statement of
Facts except as modified in his argument and in
those instances where plaintiff has omitted certain
facts, or his statement of them deviates materially
from the record.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 9 DID NOT CONSTITUTE A DIRECTED VERDICT, NOR WAS IT A
FORMULA INSTRUCTION.

Plaintiff finds two objections to the court's instruction No. 9, which is a modification of defendant's requested Instruction No. 5. First, she camplains that it is in effect a directed verdict, and
second, that it is a formula instruction and fails to
contain the theories of both parties. Each of these
matters will be discussed separately.
1. The Instruction is not in form or effect a
directed verdict.
It should be noted that the plaintiff in attempting to prove her case developed, both on direct and
on cross-examination, considerable testimony in an
apparent attempt to show that the ice was present
for a sufficient length of time to have reasonably
permitted Mr. and Mrs. Davis, defendant's custodians, to discover and remedy the condition, and
further, that the snow had been on the ground for
a sufficient length of time to have reasonably permitted Mr. and Mrs. Davis to have removed the
2
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same. In this connection the plaintiff testified that
there was snow on the ground when she awakened
between 8 :00 and 9 :00 A.M. the morning of the
accident, having observed the weather conditions
from her window (R. 88). She claimed that it had
snowed during the night and that it quit snowing
between 8:00 and 9:00 a.m. the morning of thea.cQ.1Je_n{,
Davis indicated that she arose at 6 :30 a.m. on the
morning of the accident and observed no snow on
the walks ( R. 159). When she left for a Relief Society Meeting at 9 :30 a.m. there was no snow on
the walks and it was not snowing. However, when
she returned from the meeting between 11 :30 a.m.
and 12 : 00 noon, it was snowing lightly ( R. 160).
After arriving home, she changed her clothes, fixed
lunch for her daughter and herself and was in the
process of sweeping a light skiff of snow from the
walks between 1 :00 p.m. and 1 :30 p.m., when she
was called to the telephone and advised of plaintiff's
accident ( R. 161). Mr. Davis said there was no
snow on the walks when he left for work at 7 :40
a.m. ( R. 150). The procedures with respect to caring for the walks in relation to ice and snow were
also placed in evidence by the plaintiff ( R. 154,
155). Detailed weather reports were also introduced
in evidence (Exhibit 4-P).
Plaintiff built her case upon the accumulation
of both snow and ice on the walkways and the care
that was exercised by Mr. and Mrs. Davis in maintaining them. The jury was entitled to know that
3

ice formed as a result of natural weather conditions, as opposed to artificially created conditions,
could not be charged to the responsibility of defendant or his employees. Further, if the presence of
ice, was not revealed by newly fallen snow, such
did not constitute negligence on the part of the defendant. The instruction, as given, simply goes to
the question of negligence of defendant, if any, in
permitting the accumulation of ice and snow. The instruction properly leaves open for determination by
the jury, whether or not the ice, if found to have been
present, should have been discovered before the new
snow fell, or 'if other duties to the plaintiff, as defined by the Court, had been violated. The Court fully
advised the jury of a property owner's responsibilities to tenants and their guests in Instruction 9A
(Plain tiff's Requested Instruction No. 2) ( R. 9),
which immediately fallowed the instruction to which
exception is now taken. Instruction No. 9A reads as
follows:
"You are instructed that it is the duty
of a landlord to exercise ordinary care in
maintaining in a reasonably safe condition
all parts of the premises over which he retains control, and which are used in common
by all the tenants and their guests. A viol~
tion of said duty subjects the landlord to l~
ability to a tenant or guest injured as a proximate result of such violation.
"In this respect, you are instructed that
Ray H. Barton, the owner of the premises in4

valved in this case, had the duty:
"l. To exercise ordinary care so as to
maintain common walkways in a reasonably
safe condition for tenants and guests and had
the further duty to observe any existing dangerous condition known to him or by use of
reasonable diligence would have become known
to him, which, in the exercise of ordinary
care would not be discovered by said tenants
and guests.
"2. To remedy or remove any such dangerous con di ti on.
"If you should find from a preponderance of the evidence that defendant was guilty
of negligence in either or both of the above
particulars, you should so answer the questions hereinafter to be submitted to you."
The Court's Instruction No. 10 (Plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 3), further advised the jury
that if they should find that Mr. and Mrs. Davis
were negligent, at the time in question in either or
both of the particulars referred to in Instruction
No. 9, that their negligence was then to be imputed
to and became the negligence of the defendant.
The plaintiff does not, nor can she claim any
deficiency in Instruction No. 9A, as not fully setting forth the duties of a property owner towards
the guest of a tenant. Had Instruction No. 9 been
given without the Instruction No. 9A, the jury
would, of course, not have been fully advised of the
responsibility of defendant toward his tenants and
their £ruests. Because of the evidence which had been
0

5

submitted in the case, the court properly determined that it was necessary to place the questions
concerning the accumulation of ice and snow in
proper prospective for the jury (R. 190).
This court has repeatedly announced the rule
that all instructions are to be considered and read
together. A specific instruction concerning this was
given by the Court as Instruction No. 29, which read
as follows:
"INSTRUCTION NO. 29
"These instructions, though numbered
separately, are to be considered and construed
by you as one connected whole. Each instruction should be read and understood with reference to and as a part of the en tire charge
and not as though one instruction separately
was intended to present the whole of the case
upon any particular point. For that reason
you are not to single out any certain sentence
or any individual point or instruction and ignore the others, but you are to consider all
the instructions, as a whole, and to regard
each in the light of all the others."
This well accepted principle has been repeat- ,
edly affirmed by this Court. Startin v. Madsen, 120
Ut. 631, 237 P.2d 834 ( 1951), Walkenhorst v. Kesler, 92 Ut. 312, 67 P.2d 654 (1937), Haywood v.
Rio Grande Railway, 6 Ut. 2d 155, 307 P.2d 1045
(1957).
Further, the failure to state the law fully and
completely in one instruction in the light of other
6

instructions is not prejudicial error. Taylor v. Weber
County, 4 Ut. 2d 328, 293 P.2d 925 ( 1956). The
instructions must be read in light of the whole
charge in determining whether a particular instruction was calculated to mislead the jury. Martin v.
Sheffield, 112 Ut. 478, 189 P.2d 127 ( 1948).
Plaintiff's argument that the instruction "eliminates entirely any duty whatsoever to inspect,
discover and remove accumulations of ice, regardless of how long and how notorious the existence of
the same" (Plaintiff's Brief p. 9), when considered
in light of her own instruction No. 9A, and other
instructions given by the Court defining the duties
of the parties and the manner in which the instructions were to be considered by the jury, is unsound.

tion.

2.

The Instruction is not a formula instruc-

Plaintiff's additional complaint with instruction No. 9 is that it is a formula instruction because
it fails to include plaintiff's theory that "defendant
failed to exercise ordinary care to discover and remedy the dangerous condition." Plaintiff cites Ivie
v. Richardson, 9 Ut. 2d 5, 336 P.2d 781 (1959),
as authority that the giving of Instruction No. 9
constitutes reversible error.
The instruction given in the present case is not
a formula instruction. The condemned instruction
in the Ivie case recited certain facts, which if found
by the jury would constitute negligence, and then
7

directed the jury if they so found " ... your ve1'dict must be in favor of the plaintiff and against
the defendant." The instruction failed to contain
any reference to contributory negligence which was
an issue in the case.
The Court left unanswered in the I vie case
whether the giving of such a "formula instruction"
constituted reversible error. Plaintiff need not have
resorted to general law texts in an attempt to define Utah law in this regard for it is fully set forth
in the recent case of Ortega vs. Thomas, 14 Ut.
2d 296, 383 P.2d 406 ( 1963), which was either
ignored or overlooked by the plaintiff. The instruction in the Ortega case was to the effect that if the
jury found the defendant negligent, and that it
proximately:'~aused plaintiff's injury" ... you should
determine the damages sustained by the plaintiff
... " The issue of contributory negligence was not
contained in that instruction but was contained in
a separate one.
In determining that this did not constiute reversible error, the Court said:
"Defendant argues that the giving of Instructions Nos. 12 and 14 referred to above,
separately and without correlating them,
would confuse the jury, citing the case of Ivie
v. Richardson. It is true that we there voiced
some criticism of similar instructions. In regard to that case, and its possible application
here, these observations should be made. The
criticism was also leveled at another fault.
8

The instruction regarding negligence ended
with the phrase, 'then your verdict must be
in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant.' Aware that instructions in that
form, often ref erred to as 'formula' instructions, sometimes occur over and over again in
requests for instructions, or in some instances
in instructions actually given by the court, we
observed that the instructions in that form
are undesirable because they tend to be partial and argumentive. It will be noted that
the criticism was in mild language, stating
that 'It is better to avoid giving such instructions,' and went on to say, 'of more importance is the (next) error assigned * * *'.
While we think the criticism is justified, and
we reiterate it, the reversal was not placed
solely on that ground. On the other hand, there
is precedent for refusing to do so."
The Court then stated that since the trial court
had given an appropriate instruction advising the
jury that they should not single out any particular
instruction and give it undue importance, but consirler them altogether, no error was committed. As
previously noted the court gave such a cautionary
instruction in the present case (Instruction No. 29,
R. 63).
Instruction No. 9 is not a formula instruction.
It correctly defines the responsibility of a landlord
for natural accumulations of ice and snow under
the factual issues of this case. That is all it professed to do.
The case of Konold vs. The Rio Grande West9

ern Railway Cornpany, 21 Utah 379, 60 P. 1021
( 1900), cited by the plaintiff is not helpful here.
That case dealt with the inconsistent or contradictory instructions given on a material issue in a case.
There was no inconsistency between Instruction No.
9 as given by the court and any other instruction.
It was merely explanatory of the law in the case.
The plaintiff further claims that the error in
giving instruction No. 9 was increased because another instruction advised the jury that the defendant was not a guarantor against the occurrence of
accidents on his property.
In Steele v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Ry.
Co., 16 Ut. 2d 127, 130, 396 P.2d 751, 753 (1964),
this court in denying a claim of error stated:
". . . the owner of property is not to be
regarded as an insurer for even an invitee
upon his property. His duties toward invitees
are limited to those risks which are unreasonable . . . which he has no reason to believe
such persons will discover or realize the risk
involved . . . and which he has no reason to
anticipate that persons acting with ordinary
and reasonable care will encounter . . . "
The instructions in the present case properly
advised the jury of the law concerning the duties
of the defendant as a landowner and his responsibility with respect to the natural accumulation of
ice and snow on walkways. Instruction No. 9 was
necessary to define that duty because it had become
a prominent part of plaintiff's case. It did not
10

amount to a directed verdict but was a definition
of responsibility and when read with the other instructions was a proper statement of the law of the
case. Further, the instruction was not a formula instruction in form or substance. The theory of the
defendant was fully set forth in other instructions
which he requested and were given by the court.
POINT II.
THE SUBMISSION OF UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT
IN INSTRUCTION NO. 5 WAS NOT ERROR.

Instruction No. 5 is verbatim JIFU Instruction 16.1. The identical instruction was given and approved in Porter v. Price, 11 Ut. 2d 80, 84, 355
P.2d 66 ( 1960). In that case the defendant's automobile went out of control when defendant suffered
a severe insulin shock. No evidence was presented
that he had conducted himself other than as a reasonably "well-regulated diabetic." He had no previous warning symptoms. The plaintiff claimed it
was error for the court to give an instruction on
unavoidable accident. The following language is
taken from the opinion :
"However, there are some situations
where the evidence is susceptible of being so
interpreted that an accident occurred without
negligence on the part of anyone, and if it is
reasonably susceptible of such interpretation,
and a party requests it, the trial court commits no error in so advising the jury."
Also, of significance in the Porter case is the
11

discussion of the Utah Court concerning the Calif.
ornia case of Biitigan v. Yellow Cab Co., 49 Cal.
2d 652, 320 P.2d 500, 65 A.L.R. 2d 1, upon which
plaintiff relies heavily in assigning error in the giving of the unavoidable accident instruction in the
present case. (See Plaintiff's Brief Page 16).
Of significance is the fact that the plaintiff
has failed to cite one Utah case dealing with the
question of unavoidable accident, although as will
be observed, there are several which have dealt with
this question. The cases cited by Plaintiff will be
considered first and then reference will be made
to several Utah cases.
The Utah Court in discussing the Butigan case
noted that the California court condemned the unavoidable accident instruction in part because it
was misleading in suggesting to the jury that they
"should consider unavoidability as an issue or ground
of defense separate and apart from the questions of
negligence and proximate causation." It is interesting to observe that the California Supreme Court
has since reconsidered its decision in Butigan and
has retracted considerably from the bold position
taken in that case. In Pobor v. Western Pacific,
55 Cal. 2d 314, 359 P.2d 474, 478, (Cal., 1961),
that Court made these observations:
"Question : Did the trial court commit
prejudicial error in instructing the jury, at
the request of the defendants:

* * *
( d) on unavoidable accident?
12

No. Although under Butigan v. Yellow Cab
Company, 49 Cal. 2d 652, 320 P.2d 500, 65
A.L.R. 2d 1, it is error to give an instruction
upon unavoidable accident, still it is a question for the appellate court to determine
whether the giving of the instruction constituted prejudicial error."
The lower court judgment was affirmed, there
being no determination of prejudicial error.
The plaintiff also cites the Oregon case of
Fenton v. Aleshire, 238 Ore. 24, 393 P.2d 217
( 1964), which followed the rationale of the Butigan
case, in support of her claim of error in giving an
unavoidable accident instruction. Although the Fenton case held that an instruction on unavoidable
accident should not be given in any case, two subsequent cases decided by the Oregon Supreme Court
held that the giving of such an instruction, although
error, was not prejudicial. (See McBee v. Knight,
239 Ore. 606, 398 P.2d 479 ( 1965), and Hills v. McGillvrey, ____ Ore. ____ , 402 P.2d 722 ( 1965)).
Plaintiff cites at page 21 of her Brief numerous cases for the apparent purpose of sustaining
her position that instructions on unavoidable accidents are in disfavor with the courts. The Washington case of Bennett v. McCready, 57 Wash. 2d 317,
356 P.2d 712 ( 1960), is one such case. However, in
the later Washington case of Cooper v. Pay-N-Save
Drugs, Inc., 59 Wash. 2d 829, 371 P.2d 43, the court
reaffirmed its long standing position that it is proper
to give such an instruction if the facts warrant it.
13

Plaintiff also cites the case of Carlb1trg v. Wesley Hospital and Nurse Training School, 182 Kan.
634, 323 P.2d 638 ( 1958), in favor of her position.
In that case the plaintiff was injured when he fell
out of defendant's hospital bed while he was under
the influence of drugs and a patient at the hospital.
The Court there merely held that the facts did not
lend itself to an instruction on unavoidable accident
because under the circumstances, the plaintiff was
under the "complete" control of the hospital and its
employees and there was nothing unavoidable about
the accident. The Court recognized that such an
instruction is proper where the occurrence is not
contributed to by the negligent act or omission of
either party.
Although plaintiff characterizes the recent decisions of Courts of other states as being the '''clear
trend of authorities toward condemnation of unavoidable accident instructions in automobile collision cases" (emphasis added), it is evident from a
review of those cases that even the California Court
has retrenched from the position it appeared to take
in the Butigan case. The Idaho Supreme Court in
the 1964 case of Hackworth v. Davis, 87 Ida. 98, 390
P.2d 422, refused to follow the California case in
Butigan v. Yellow Cab Co. With few exceptions the
Courts still recognize that in proper circumstances
an unavoidable instruction is proper for the purpose
of clarifying issues for the jury. The Utah Courts
have consistently followed this procedure.
14

A case which is similar in many respects to the
one at bar is Dennison v. Chapman, 6 Ut. 2d 379,
382, 314 P.2d 838, 840 ( 1957). There plaintiff sued
for injuries sustained when an automobile driven
by him collided with a truck which had crossed into
his lane of traffic after it was struck by the defendant's automobile which suddenly spun out of
control on icy roads as it was being passed by the
truck. The Supreme Court sustained a dismissal of
the case finding that there was sufficient evidence
to justify a determination that the accident was not
the result of anyone's negligence.
The following language is taken from the opimon:
"To say that this type of accident could
not happen except for negligence is specious.
NI any tinies accidents are caused by icy conditions beyond the control of any of the parties involved. Likewise, the icy roads would
remove the element of exclusive control from
the defendants. A person cannot be in exclusive control of a vehicle under weather conditions in which the elements can act at variance with the control of the operator."(Emphasis added)
The instant case is particularly suited to an instruction on unavoidable accident. As in the Dennison case, icy conditions were involved. Weather obYiously created conditions over which neither of the
parties had any control. There was sufficient evidence in the record which were reasonably susepti hle to a finding that neither the defendant nor the
15

plaintiff were negligent in the manner in which they
conducted themselves. The jury was therefor properly advised that in certain situations legal responsibility does not attach to either party.
The present case clearly comes within that class
of cases referred to in Porter v. Price, 11 Ut. 2d
80, 355 P.2d 66 ( 1960). The Court there stated that
if the evidence is reasonably susceptible to the interpretation that the accident occurred without the
negligence on the part of anyone, and if a party
makes such a request, that the trial court commits no
error in so advising the jury. See also Wellman v. ,
Noble, 12 Ut. 2d 350, 366 P.2d 701 (1961), where
the Court again stated that in cases where the facts
warrant doing so, it is not error to give an instruction on unavoidable accident, and Jensen v. Dolen,
12 Ut. 2d 404, 367 P.2d 191 (1962).
No cases are cited to the contrary by the plain- ;
tiff, but she suggests that the Utah court follow
the uncertain sound of the Butigan case.
CONCLUSION
Instruction No. 9 properly advised the jury
concerning the responsibility of a landowner for
natural accumulations of ice and snow upon property controlled by him. The instruction was appropriate because of the prominence of evidence introduced into the case by plaintiff concerning the
alleged presence of ice and snow prior to, at, and
subsequent to the time of the accident. The instruc16

tion was not a formula instruction, and even if
found to be such, did not constitute prejudicial error.
The instruction given concerning unavoidable
accident was particularly appropriate because there
was evidence of weather conditions which was reasonably susceptible to an interpretation by the jury
that the accident occurred without negligence on the
part of anyone. This court has consistently affirmed such an instruction when given in easer similar
to this one. The jury verdict should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON & BALDWIN &
MERLIN R. LYBBERT
909 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondent
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